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Abstract We extend the Abrams–Strogatz model for competition between
two languages [Nature 424, 900 (2003)] to the case of n(≥ 2) competing states
(i.e., languages). Although the Abrams–Strogatz model for n = 2 can be in-
terpreted as modeling either majority preference or minority aversion, the
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two mechanisms are distinct when n ≥ 3. We find that the condition for the
coexistence of different states is independent of n under the pure majority
preference, whereas it depends on n under the pure minority aversion. We also
show that the stable coexistence equilibrium and stable monopoly equilibria
can be multistable under the minority aversion and not under the majority
preference. Furthermore, we obtain the phase diagram of the model when the
effects of the majority preference and minority aversion are mixed, under the
condition that different states have the same attractiveness. We show that the
multistability is a generic property of the model facilitated by large n.
Keywords Consensus · Majority rule · Population dynamics · Social
dynamics
PACS 89.65.-s · 87.23.Ge · 89.65.Ef
1 Introduction
The consensus problem, in which we ask whether the unanimity of one among
different competing states (e.g., opinions) is reached, and its mechanisms are
of interest in various disciplines including political science, sociology, and sta-
tistical physics. In models of consensus formation, it is usually assumed that
each individual possesses one of the different states that can flip over time.
The flip rate depends on the environment such as the number of the individ-
uals that adopt a different state. Statistical physicists have approached this
problem by analyzing a variety of models including the voter model, majority
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rule models, the bounded confidence model, Axelrod’s model, and the naming
game (see [3] for a review).
A major mechanism that would lead to consensus in a population is pref-
erence for the majority. Collective opinion formation under various majority
voting rules has been examined for mean-field populations [8,11,12,13,15,19,
26] and in different types of networks such as regular lattices [7,8,9,22,31],
small-world networks [21], heterogeneous networks [17], and networks with
community structure [16,18]. The majority preference may be identified with
the aversion to the minority. When there are only two states, they are equiv-
alent because one state is the majority if and only if the other state is the
minority. However, the two principles may be distinct when more than two
states are assumed [34]. We are concerned with this case in the present study.
Language competition is an example of consensus problems. The model
proposed by Abrams and Strogatz (AS model) accounts for extinction of en-
dangered languages [1]. The AS model implements competition between two
languages for speakers in a population. The dynamics of the model is based
on the majority preference, which is also regarded as the minority aversion
because there are just two competing languages.
Several authors found that different languages can stably coexist in variants
of the AS model. Two languages can coexist by spatial segregation in a model
in which competition dynamics and spatial diffusion are combined [28,29]. A
Lotka–Volterra variant of the AS model also leads to coexistence [30]. Intro-
duction of bilingual individuals also enables coexistence [24,25]. Castello´ and
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colleagues investigated variants of the AS model with bilingualism on various
networks [4,5,32,33]. Coexistence also occurs when the attractiveness of lan-
guages is dynamically manipulated [6] or when bilingualism, horizontal (i.e.,
from adults to adults) and vertical (i.e., from adults to children) transmission
of languages, and dynamics of the languages’ attractiveness are combined [23,
35].
In the present work, we extend the AS model to the case of competition
among a general number of languages, denoted by n. Our model is a mean-
field model (i.e., without spatial or network structure), as is the original AS
model. Because the AS model has been used for modeling competition of other
cultural or social traits such as religion [2], opinion, and service sectors [20],
we use the term “state” instead of “language” in the following. We show that
the behavior of the model is essentially different between n = 2 and n ≥ 3.
In particular, the coexistence of different states and the consensus can be
multistable, i.e., the coexistence and consensus equilibria are both stable, only
when n ≥ 3.
2 Model
We extend the AS model to the case of competition among n(≥ 2) states. The
dynamics of the fraction of state i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is given by
dxi
dt
=
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xjPji − xi
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Pij , (1)
A model of competition among more than two languages 5
where xi is the fraction of state i in the population, and Pji represents the
transition rate from state j to state i. Equation (1) respects the conservation
law
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. The transition rates of the original AS model (i.e., n = 2)
are given by
Pji = csix
a
i = csi(1− xj)
a ((i, j) = (1, 2), (2, 1)) , (2)
where a > 0 controls the strength of the frequency-dependent state transition,
si > 0 is the attractiveness of state i, and
∑n
i=1 si = 1 [1]. Because c simply
specifies the time scale of the dynamics, we set c = 1.
Equation (2) allows two interpretations: majority preference because Pji =
six
a
i and minority aversion because Pji = si(1− xj)
a. The two principles lead
to the same model when n = 2. However, the two principles are distinct when
n ≥ 3. Therefore, we redefine Pji to allow for independent manipulation of the
two factors. The transition rates of the extended model are defined by
Pji = six
β
i (1− xj)
a−β , (3)
where β(≥ 0) and a−β(≥ 0) represent the strength of the majority preference
and the minority aversion, respectively. When n = 2, the dynamics given by
the substitution of Eq. (3) in Eq. (1) becomes independent of the β value.
3 Analysis
3.1 Case of majority preference (i.e., β = a)
In this section, we set β = a to analyze the case in which the majority prefer-
ence is present and the minority aversion is absent. Substitution of Eq. (3) in
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Eq. (1) yields
dxi
dt
=
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xjsix
a
i − xi
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
sjx
a
j
=
(
six
a−1
i −
〈
sxa−1
〉)
xi, (4)
where 〈·〉 represents the average over the population, i.e., the average of a
state-dependent variable with weight xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Equation (4) is a repli-
cator equation [14] in which six
a−1
i and
〈
sxa−1
〉
=
∑n
ℓ=1 sℓx
a
ℓ play the role of
the fitness for state i and the average fitness in the population, respectively.
The dynamics given by Eq. (4) has n trivial equilibria corresponding to the
consensus, i.e., the monopoly of a single state, and an interior equilibrium
given by
x∗i =
s
1
1−a
i∑n
ℓ=1 s
1
1−a
ℓ
(1 ≤ i ≤ n). (5)
V (x) ≡ −
〈
sxa−1
〉
, where x = (x1, . . . , xn), is a Lyapunov function of the
dynamics given by Eq. (4) because
dV (x)
dt
= −
n∑
i=1
siax
a−1
i
dxi
dt
= −a
n∑
i=1
six
a
i
(
six
a−1
i −
〈
sxa−1
〉)
= −a
(〈
(sxa−1)2
〉
−
〈
sxa−1
〉2)
≤ 0. (6)
V has a unique global extremum at x∗, which is minimum for a < 1 and
maximum for a > 1 (Appendix A). Therefore, the coexistence equilibrium
given by Eq. (5) is globally stable for a < 1 and unstable for a > 1.
Equation (4) also admits a unique equilibrium for each subset of the n
states. When n = 3, for example, the equilibrium in which states 1 and 2,
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but not 3, coexist is given by Eq. (5) for i = 1 and 2, with the denominator
replaced by s
1
1−a
1
+ s
1
1−a
2
, and x3 = 0. In general, there are
(
n
n′
)
equilibria
containing n′ states. If 2 ≤ n′ ≤ n−1, these equilibria are unstable. For a < 1,
the instability immediately follows from the fact that x∗ is the unique global
minimum of V (x). For a > 1, any equilibrium containing n′ (2 ≤ n′ ≤ n− 1)
states is unstable because it realizes the global maximum of the same Lyapunov
function restricted to the simplex spanned by the n′ states.
When a = 1, we obtain V (x) ≡ −〈s〉 =
∑n
i=1 sixi. Therefore, if si > sj
(j 6= i), the consensus of state i is eventually reached. If si = si′ > sj (j 6= i, i
′),
for example, the n − 2 states corresponding to sj (j 6= i, i
′) are eventually
eliminated. The dynamics then stops such that states i and i′ coexist. If all
the three si values are equal, any population is neutrally stable.
Figure 1 represents the dynamics in the two regimes with n = 3, which we
obtained by numerically integrating Eq. (4). For a < 1, a trajectory starting
from anywhere in the interior of the phase space, i.e., x that satisfies x1+x2+
x3 = 1, x1, x2, x3 > 0, asymptotically approaches the coexistence equilibrium
(Fig. 1a). It should be noted that a point in the triangle in Fig. 1a corresponds
to a configuration of the population, i.e., x. For example, corner ei (i = 1, 2,
or 3) represents the consensus (i.e., xi = 1 and xj = 0 (j 6= i)), and the
normalized Euclidean distance from the point to the edge e2–e3 of the triangle
is equal to the x1 value. For a > 1, a trajectory starting from the interior of
the triangle converges to one of the n consensus equilibria, depending on the
initial condition (Fig. 1b).
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In Fig. 2, a bifurcation diagram in which we plot x∗
1
against a is shown for
s1 = 0.40, s2 = 0.35, and s3 = 0.25. As a approaches unity from below, the
stable coexistence equilibrium approaches the unstable consensus equilibrium
corresponding to the largest si value (e1 in Fig. 1). At a = 1, the two equilibria
collide, and an unstable coexistence equilibrium simultaneously bifurcates from
the consensus equilibrium corresponding to the smallest si value (e3 in Fig. 1).
(a)
e
1
e
2
e
3
(b)
e
1
e
2
e
3
Fig. 1 Dynamics of the extended AS model when the majority preference is present and
the minority aversion is absent. We set n = 3, β = a, s1 = 0.40, s2 = 0.35, and s3 = 0.25.
(a) a = 0.5 and (b) a = 1.4. Solid and open circles represent stable and unstable equilibria,
respectively.
3.2 Case of minority aversion (i.e., β = 0)
In this section, we set β = 0 to analyze the case in which the majority prefer-
ence is absent and the minority aversion is present. Substitution of Eq. (3) in
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Fig. 2 Bifurcation diagram for the extended AS model when the majority preference is
present and the minority aversion is absent. The parameter values are equal to those used
in Fig. 1 except that we vary a.
Eq. (1) yields
dxi
dt
= si
n∑
j=1
xj(1− xj)
a − (1− xi)
axi
= si 〈(1− x)
a〉 − (1− xi)
axi. (7)
In contrast to the case of the majority preference (Sect. 3.1), the simplex
spanned by n′ (2 ≤ n′ ≤ n − 1) states is not invariant under the dynamics
given by Eq. (7). Therefore, a state that once gets extinct may reappear. In
this section, we numerically analyze Eq. (7) for n = 3 and n = 4. For general
n, we analytically examine the special case in which si is independent of i in
Sect. 3.3.
For n = 3, the dynamics for various values of a is shown in Fig. 3. We
set s1 = 0.36, s2 = 0.33, and s3 = 0.31. When a is small (a < 1), there is
a unique globally stable coexistence equilibrium in the interior (Fig. 3a). The
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three consensus equilibria e1, e2, and e3 are unstable. At a = 1, e1, e2, and e3
change the stability such that they are stable beyond a = 1 (Appendix B). Si-
multaneously, a saddle point bifurcates from each consensus equilibrium. The
bifurcation occurs simultaneously for the three equilibria at a = 1 irrespective
of the values of s1, s2, and s3. Slightly beyond a = 1, the three consensus equi-
libria and the interior coexistence equilibrium are multistable (see Fig. 3b for
the results at a = 1.3). As a increases, the attractive basin of the coexistence
equilibrium becomes small, and that of each consensus equilibrium becomes
large (see Fig. 3c for the results at a = 1.4). At a = ac1 ≈ 1.43, the coexistence
equilibrium that is stable for a < ac1 and the unstable interior equilibrium that
bifurcates from ei at a = 1, where i corresponds to the largest si value (i = 1
in the present example), collide. This is a saddle-node bifurcation.
Numerically obtained ac1 values are shown in Fig. 4a for different values
of s1, s2, and s3. A point in the triangle in the figure specifies the values of
s1, s2, and s3 under the constraint s1 + s2 + s3 = 1, si > 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). It
seems that ac1 is the largest when si = 1/3 (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). Figure 4 suggests that
heterogeneity in si makes ac1 smaller and hence makes the stable coexistence
of the three states difficult. When si ≈ 1 and sj ≈ 0 (j 6= i), we obtain ac1 ≈ 1.
When a is slightly larger than ac1, there are two saddle points in the
interior. In this situation, one of the three consensus equilibria, which depends
on the initial condition, is eventually reached (Fig. 3d). However, the manner
with which the triangular phase space is divided into the three attractive
basins is qualitatively different from that in the case of the majority preference
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(Fig. 1b). In particular, in the present case of the minority aversion, even if x1
is initially equal to 0, the consensus of state 1 (i.e., e1) can be reached. This
behavior never occurs in the case of the majority preference and less likely for
a larger a value in the case of the minority aversion (Fig. 3e).
The sizes of the attractive basins of the different equilibria are plotted
against a in Fig. 5a. Up to our numerical efforts with various initial conditions,
we did not find limit cycles. A discrete jump in the basin size of the coexis-
tence equilibrium is observed at ac1 ≈ 1.43, reminiscent of the saddle-node
bifurcation. Interestingly, the attractive basin of the consensus equilibrium e1
is the largest just beyond ac1.
As a increases further, the second saddle-node bifurcation occurs at a =
ac2 ≈ 2.81, where an unstable node and a saddle point coappear (Fig. 3f).
Logically, the sizes of the attractive basins could be discontinuous at a = ac2
because some initial conditions with small x1 might be attracted to e1 when a
is slightly smaller than ac2 and to e2 or e3 when a is slightly larger than ac2.
However, up to our numerical efforts, we did not observe the discontinuity, as
implied by Fig. 5a.
Numerically obtained ac2 values are shown in Fig. 4b for different values of
s1, s2, and s3. Heterogeneity in si makes ac2 larger. In addition, ac2 is equal to
ac1 when s1 = s2 = s3 = 1/3. In this symmetric case, the three saddle points
simultaneously collide with the stable star node at a = 1. Beyond a = 1,
the equilibrium that is the stable star node when a < 1 loses its stability to
become an unstable star node. The three saddle points move away from the
12 Ryo Fujie et al.
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Fig. 3 Dynamics of the extended AS model when the majority preference is absent and the
minority aversion is present. We set n = 3, β = 0, s1 = 0.36, s2 = 0.33, and s3 = 0.31. (a)
a = 0.9, (b) a = 1.3, (c) a = 1.4, (d) a = 1.5, (e) a = 2.6, (f) a = 2.9, and (g) a = 10.0.
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Fig. 4 Dependence of (a) ac1 and (b) ac2 on s1, s2, and s3 when the majority preference is
absent and the minority aversion is present. A point in the triangle corresponds to a triplet
(s1, s2, s3), where s1 + s2 + s3 = 1 and si ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ 3).
unstable star node as a increases. This transition can be interpreted as three
simultaneously occurring transcritical bifurcations.
The unstable node that emerges at a = ac2 approaches x
∗
i = 1/3 (1 ≤
i ≤ 3) in the limit a → ∞, as shown in Appendix C. The three saddle points
approach (x1, x2, x3) = (1/2, 1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2), and (0, 1/2, 1/2), as shown
in Fig. 3g. This is a trivial consequence of the proof given in Appendix C.
Therefore, the heterogeneity in si does not play the role in the limit a → ∞
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such that the phase space is symmetrically divided into the three attractive
basins corresponding to e1, e2, and e3.
For n = 4, the relationship between a and the sizes of the attractive basins
of the different equilibria is shown in Fig. 5b. The results are qualitatively the
same as those for n = 3 (Fig. 5a).
3.3 Symmetric case
In the previous sections, we separately considered the effect of the majority
preference (Sect. 3.1) and the minority aversion (Sect. 3.2). In this section,
we examine the extended AS model when both effects can be combined. To
gain analytical insight into the model, we focus on the symmetric case si = s
(1 ≤ i ≤ n). Although normalization
∑n
i=1 si = 1 leads to si = 1/n, we set
s = 1 in this section to simplify the notation; s just controls the time scale of
the dynamics. Then, Eqs. (1) and (3) are reduced to
dxi
dt
= xβi
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj(1− xj)
a−β − xi(1− xi)
a−β
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
xβj . (8)
Equation (8) implies that, regardless of the parameter values, there exist
n trivial consensus equilibria and symmetric coexistence equilibria of n′ (2 ≤
n′ ≤ n) states given by x∗i = 1/n
′, where i varies over the n′ surviving states
arbitrarily selected from the n states.
Owing to the conservation law
∑n
i=1 xi = 1, the dynamics are (n − 1)-
dimensional. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the dynamics at the
coexistence equilibrium containing the n states are (n− 1)-fold and given by
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Fig. 5 Sizes of the attractive basins for different equilibria when the majority preference
is absent and the minority aversion is present. The lines with legend “State i” represent
the basin size for the consensus equilibrium of state i. The lines with legend “Coexistence”
represent the basin size for the coexistence equilibrium. (a) n = 3, β = 0, s1 = 0.36,
s2 = 0.33, and s3 = 0.31. (b) n = 4, β = 0, s1 = 0.28, s2 = 0.26, s3 = 0.24, and s4 = 0.22.
We obtain ac1 ≈ 1.43 and ac2 ≈ 2.81 in (a) and ac1 ≈ 1.91 and ac2 ≈ 3.29 in (b). We
calculate the sizes of the attractive basins as follows. First, we take the initial condition (x1,
x2, x3) = (0.01i, 0.01j, 0.01k), where i, j, k ≥ 1, i+ j + k = 100, for n = 3 and (x1, x2, x3,
x4) = (0.05i, 0.05j, 0.05k, 0.05ℓ), where i, j, k, ℓ ≥ 1, i+j+k+ℓ = 20, for n = 4. Second, we
run the dynamics starting from each initial condition until the trajectory converges. Third,
we count fraction of the initial conditions that converge to each stable equilibrium.
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(
1
n
)β (
1− 1
n
)a−β−1
[(n− 2)β + a− n+ 1], as shown in Appendix D. There-
fore, the coexistence equilibrium is stable if and only if
(n− 2)β + a− n+ 1 < 0. (9)
Similarly, we show in Appendix B that the consensus equilibria are stable if
and only if
a > 1. (10)
Coexistence equilibria of n′ (2 ≤ n′ ≤ n − 1) states are always unstable
(Appendix D).
Figure 6 is the phase diagram of the model in which the stable equilibria
for given parameter values are indicated. The thin solid and dashed lines sep-
arating two phases are given by Eqs. (9) and (10), respectively. A multistable
parameter region exists when n ≥ 3; Eq. (9) is reduced to a < 1 when n = 2.
When n ≥ 3, the multistablity occurs except in the case of the pure major-
ity preference (i.e., β = a). The multistable parameter region enlarges as n
increases.
4 Discussion
We analyzed an extended AS model with n states. We showed that the in-
troduction of the minority aversion as compared to the majority preference
changes the behavior of the model with n ≥ 3 in two main aspects. First, differ-
ent states stably coexist up to a larger a value with the minority aversion than
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Fig. 6 Phase diagram of the extended AS model when all the si values are equal. The thin
solid lines and the thin dashed line are given by Eqs. (9) and (10), respectively.
with the majority preference. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a is the ex-
ponent associated with different quantities in the two cases (Eq. (3)). Second,
the multistability of the consensus equilibria and the coexistence equilibrium
is facilitated by the minority aversion and opposed by the majority preference.
We verified that the main results also hold true in the case of more general
transition rates than Eq. (3), expressed as Pji = s
γ
i (1 − sj)
1−γxβi (1 − xj)
a−β
(Appendix E).
Volovik and colleagues examined mean-field dynamics of a three-state opin-
ion formation model with minority aversion [34]. Coexistence of at least two
states occurs in their model even if a random choice term, equivalent to diffu-
sive coupling, which the authors assumed, is turned off. This is because only
the most minor state decreases in the number of individuals and the other two
major states are equally strong in their model. In our model, the most major
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and second major states have different strengths in attracting individuals, and
the coexistence equilibrium is stable only for small a.
Fu and Wang considered the combined effects of the majority preference
and minority avoidance on coevolution of opinions and network structure [10].
They assumed that the majority preference is used for collective opinion forma-
tion and the minority avoidance guides network formation. They showed that
segregated groups, each composed of individuals with the same opinion, evolve
when the minority avoidance is dominantly used. The coexistence of multiple
states owing to the segregation has also been shown in spatially extended AS
models [28,29]. We showed that coexistence of different states is facilitated by
the minority aversion, not by the majority preference, and that stable coexis-
tence occurs without segregation, or other spatial or network mechanisms.
Nowak and colleagues analyzed a replicator–mutator equation as a model of
language evolution [27]. They showed that coexistence of different grammars
(i.e., states in our terminology) and a consensus-like configuration in which
one grammar dominates the others are multistable when a learning parameter
takes an intermediate value. If the learning is accurate, the consensus-like
configuration becomes monostable. Our model and theirs differ in at least two
aspects. First, the control parameter in our model is a, that is, the strength of
the sum of the majority preference and minority aversion. Second, the stable
coexistence in our model requires some minority aversion, whereas their model
takes into account the majority preference but not the minority aversion.
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A Unimodality of the Lyapunov function
We denote the Hessian of V (x) by H(V ), which is an (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix owing to the
conservation law
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. We obtain
Hij(V ) =
∂2V (x)
∂xi∂xj
=


a(1 − a)
(
six
a−2
i + snx
a−2
n
)
(1 ≤ i = j ≤ n− 1),
a(1 − a)snx
a−2
n (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n− 1),
(11)
where xn = 1 −
∑n−1
i=1 xi and sn = 1 −
∑n−1
i=1 si. For any x, H(V ) is positive (negative)
definite for a < 1 (a > 1) because
y
TH(V )y =
n−1∑
i=1
a(1 − a)six
a−2
i
y2i +
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
a(1 − a)snx
a−2
n yiyj
= a(1− a)

n−1∑
i=1
six
a−2
i
y2i + snx
a−2
n
(
n−1∑
i=1
yi
)2 ≷ 0 (a ≶ 1) , (12)
for any (n−1)-dimensional nonzero vector y. Therefore, V (x) is strictly convex (concave) for
a < 1 (a > 1) and hence has a unique global extremum at x∗, which realizes the minimum
(maximum) of V (x).
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B Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in the consensus equilibria
On the basis of Eqs. (1) and (3), the (n − 1) × (n − 1) Jacobian matrix (Jij) = (∂x˙i/∂xj)
(1 ≤ i, j ≤ n− 1) is represented by
Jii = lim
xi→x
∗
i
xk=x
∗
k (k 6=i)

 n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kji − lin −
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
lji + kin

 (13)
and
Jij = lim
xj→x
∗
j
xk=x
∗
k (k 6=j)
(lij − lin − kij + kin) (i 6= j), (14)
where
kji ≡ βsix
β−1
i xj(1− xj)
a−β , (15)
lji ≡ sj(1 − xi)
a−β−1[1− (a − β + 1)xi]x
β
j , (16)
and
xn = 1−
n−1∑
i=1
xi. (17)
By exploiting symmetry, we examine the Jacobian matrix at the consensus equilibrium
given by xi = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) and xn = 1. In this case, Eqs. (13) and (14) are reduced to
Jii = asi lim
xi→0
xa−1i − sn (18)
and
Jij = 0, (19)
respectively. Therefore, irrespective of the value of β, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix,
denoted by λi (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), are given by
λi = Jii =


−sn (a > 1),
si − sn (a = 1),
+∞ (a < 1).
(20)
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C Coexistence equilibrium when a→∞
For general n, Eq. (7) implies that
(1− xi)
axi
si
= 〈(1− x)a〉 (1 ≤ i ≤ n) (21)
is satisfied at the equilibrium. In particular, we obtain
(1− x∗i )
ax∗i
si
=
(1 − x∗j )
ax∗j
sj
(i 6= j). (22)
Equation (22) leads to
lim
a→∞
(
log(1 − x∗i ) +
log x∗i
a
−
log si
a
)
= lim
a→∞
(
log(1− x∗j ) +
log x∗j
a
−
log sj
a
)
. (23)
Because the third term on each side of Eq. (23) is negligible, we obtain
lim
a→∞
1− x∗i
1− x∗j
(
x∗i
x∗j
) 1
a
= 1. (24)
The coexistence implies that x∗i and x
∗
j do not tend to 0 as a → ∞. Therefore, Eq. (24)
leads to x∗i = x
∗
j in the limit a→∞. Therefore, x
∗
i = 1/n (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
D Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in the coexistence equilibria
in the symmetric case
On the basis of Eq. (8), the (n−1)×(n−1) Jacobian matrix (Jij) = (∂x˙i/∂xj) is represented
by Eqs. (13)–(17) with si = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n). At the coexistence equilibrium given by x∗i = 1/n
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), Eqs. (13) and (14) are reduced to
Jii = n(k − l) =
(
1
n
)β (
1−
1
n
)a−β−1
[(n− 2)β + a− n+ 1] (25)
and
Jij = 0, (26)
respectively. Therefore, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are (n − 1)-fold degenerate
and given by
λi = Jii =
(
1
n
)β (
1−
1
n
)a−β−1
[(n− 2)β + a− n+ 1] (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1). (27)
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By exploiting symmetry, we consider the coexistence equilibrium of n′ states given by
x∗i = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n−n
′) and x∗i = 1/n
′ (n− n′+1 ≤ i ≤ n). In this case, Eqs. (13) and (14)
with si = 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are reduced to
Jii =


β
(
1− 1
n′
)a−β
limxi→0 x
β−1
i −
(
1
n′
)β−1
(1 ≤ i ≤ n− n′),
(
1
n′
)β (
1− 1
n′
)a−β−1
[(n′ − 2)β + a − n′ + 1] (n− n′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1),
(28)
Jij =


(
1
n′
)β+1 (
1− 1
n′
)a−β−1
[(n′ − 2)β + a − n′ + 1] (n− n′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
+
(
1
n′
)β
− β 1
n′
(
1− 1
n′
)a−β
limxj→0 x
β−1
j and 1 ≤ j ≤ n− n
′),
0 (otherwise).
(29)
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are the diagonal entries because the Jacobian matrix
is a triangular matrix. Therefore, we obtain
λi = Jii =


−
(
1
n′
)β−1
(β > 1),
(
1− 1
n′
)a−1
− 1 (β = 1),
+∞ (β < 1),
(30)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− n′ and
λi = Jii =
(
1
n′
)β (
1−
1
n′
)a−β−1
[(n′ − 2)β + a− n′ + 1] (31)
for n − n′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Equations (30) and (31) imply that at least one eigenvalue is
positive unless a = β = 1. When a = β = 1, all the eigenvalues are equal to zero.
E Analysis of a generalized model
Consider a variant of the extended AS model in which the transition rate given by Eq. (3)
is replaced by
Pji = s
γ
i (1− sj)
1−γxβi (1− xj)
a−β , (32)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Equation (3) is reproduced with γ = 1. Here, the exponents γ and 1 − γ
represent the strength of the preference for a strong state and the aversion to a weak state,
respectively.
A model of competition among more than two languages 23
In the case of the majority preference (i.e., β = a), Eq. (1) with the transition rates
given by Eq. (32) has n trivial equilibria corresponding to the consensus and an interior
equilibrium given by
x∗i =
(
s−γi (1− si)
1−γ
) 1
a−1
∑n
ℓ=1
(
s−γ
ℓ
(1− sℓ)1−γ
) 1
a−1
. (33)
There also exists a unique equilibrium composed of arbitrarily chosen n′ states (2 ≤ n′ ≤
n− 1). The Lyapunov function is given by
V (x) = −
〈
sγxa−1
〉
〈(1− s)1−γ〉a
. (34)
V (x) is a Lyapunov function because
d
〈
sγxa−1
〉
dt
=
n∑
i=1
sγi ax
a−1
i
dxi
dt
= a
n∑
i=1
sγi x
a−1
i
[
sγi x
a
i
〈
(1− s)1−γ
〉
− (1− si)
1−γxi
〈
sγxa−1
〉]
= a
(〈
(sγxa−1)2
〉 〈
(1 − s)1−γ
〉
−
〈
sγxa−1(1− s)1−γ
〉 〈
sγxa−1
〉)
(35)
and
d
〈
(1− s)1−γ
〉
dt
=
n∑
i=1
(1− si)
1−γ dxi
dt
=
n∑
i=1
(1− si)
1−γ
[
sγi x
a
i
〈
(1− s)1−γ
〉
− (1− si)
1−γxi
〈
sγxa−1
〉]
=
〈
sγxa−1(1− s)1−γ
〉 〈
(1 − s)1−γ
〉
−
〈
(1 − s)2(1−γ)
〉 〈
sγxa−1
〉
(36)
lead to
dV (x)
dt
= −
d
dt
〈
sγxa−1
〉
〈(1 − s)1−γ 〉a
+
a
〈
sγxa−1
〉
d
dt
〈
(1− s)1−γ
〉
〈(1− s)1−γ〉a+1
= −
a
(〈
A2
〉
〈B〉2 − 2 〈AB〉 〈A〉 〈B〉 + 〈A〉2
〈
B2
〉)
〈B〉a+1
= −
a
〈
(A 〈B〉 − 〈A〉B)2
〉
〈B〉a+1
≤ 0, (37)
where A ≡ sγxa−1 and B ≡ (1− s)1−γ .
We have no proof of the unimodality of V (x). However, we numerically verified the
unimodality for n = 3. These results are the same as those obtained in the main text for
γ = 1 (Sect. 3.1).
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For any β, the Jacobian matrix (Jij) = (∂x˙i/∂xj) is given by Eqs. (13) and (14), where
kji ≡ βs
γ
i (1− sj)
1−γxβ−1i xj(1− xj)
a−β , (38)
lji ≡ s
γ
i (1− sj)
1−γ (1− xj)
a−β−1[1− (a − β + 1)xj ]x
β
i , (39)
and
xn = 1−
n−1∑
i=1
xi. (40)
In the consensus equilibrium given by xi = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) and xn = 1, Eqs. (13) and
(14) are reduced to
Jii = as
γ
i (1 − sn)
1−γ lim
xi→0
xa−1i − s
γ
n(1 − si)
1−γ (41)
and
Jij = 0, (42)
respectively. Therefore, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are given by
λi = Jii =


−sγn(1 − si)
1−γ (a > 1),
sγi (1− sn)
1−γ − sγn(1− si)
1−γ (a = 1),
+∞ (a < 1),
(43)
and the consensus equilibrium is stable if a > 1.
In the case of the minority aversion (i.e., β = 0), when n = 3, the sizes of the attractive
basins for different equilibria for γ = 0 and γ = 0.5 are shown in Figs. 7a and 7b, respectively.
The results are qualitatively the same as those for γ = 1 (Fig. 5a).
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